Problem Typology and Sensemaking in a Changing World
In a world of mind-numbing global interconnected complexity, it is difficult to develop effective tools for problem-solving and sensemaking in complex situations. The 2019 World Wide Threat Assessment outlines a myriad of potential global threats that require attention. Some examples include: cybersecurity, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, emerging and disruptive technologies, and transnational organized crime. Other global threats include climate change, poverty, emergent zoonotic diseases and antibiotic resistant bacteria, just to name a few.
Creating strategies to deal with the increasingly complex challenges is a major responsibility of security practitoners but there is a gap for many because they can’t develop sufficient models to deal with the complexity.
Historically, in the United States we have used a military command and control model constructed as top-down regarding accountability. We have adopted military language to talk about complex problems such as “war on terror,” “war on cancer,” war on poverty.” The thinking is that “we battle, we fight, and if we survive, we’re victorious.” In the “war on cancer” example, the attitude traces back in part to 1969, when the Citizens Committee for the Conquest of Cancer ran an ad in The Washington Post and The New York Times imploring the president with the words “Mr. Nixon: You can cure cancer.” The call to action helped trigger the country’s “war on cancer” with a determination that, using enough medical weaponry, the malignant foe could be obliterated.
Times, they are a changing. The global community is increasingly being tasked with solving very complex and chaotic problems. A cognitive shift is needed now to move away from the linear, top-down and “war on X,” methodology to a reassessment of the traditional way problems have been addressed.
The increasingly complex and chaotic problems now facing the world challenge governance structures, the current skills base and organizational capacity of global security. Many of the global challenges have moved into a category of “wicked problems.” A wicked problem is not just increased degree of difficulty and traditional top-down linear strategies to address them are not sufficient.
The nutshell defintion of a wicked problem is a social or cultural problem that is difficult or impossible to solve for as many as four reasons:
- incomplete or contradictory knowledge,
2. the number of people and opinions involved,
3. the large economic burden, and
4. the interconnected nature of these problems with other problems.
In short, there is a fundamental disconnect between the traditional ways of solving problems in the past and the emergent wicked problems of today.
This blog post seeks to highlight the importance of understanding what kind of problems are being presented and applying new kinds sensemaking frameworks to better understand them. I highlight the incredible work of Dr. Nancy C. Roberts, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Graduate School for Operational and Information Sciences in the Department of Defense Analysis and and David John Snowden, a management consultant for Cognitive Edge Pte, Ltd.
Dr. Roberts’s article titled, “Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution,” can be found in the International Public Management Review,Volume 1 · Issue 1 · 2000. Dave Snowden is known for his “Cynefin Sensemaking Framework” used in decision-making. The Cynefin Framework provides the backdrop of a groundbreaking article called , “A Leader’s Framework for Decision-Making, published in November of 2007.
Examining these two resources can help security practitioners understand how to operate in a complex/chaotic or wicked environment and assist with decision-making and judgment calls. Hopefully, the tools are not just used when a disaster is active but as a preconception and trouble-shooting tool prior to any given wicked problem.
Problem Typology
There are new kinds of problems increasingly experienced in the homeland security ecosystem that defy traditional solutions of the past. These problems have no definitive definition with broad disagreement of the problem and solutions to be applied. There is broad disagreement and competition by security practitioners to frame it. And, political and resource constraints are constantly changing, fraught with human factors such as failed communication, territoriality and tribal input.
In Roberts framework, problems are divided into 3 categories, Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3. In Snowden’s sensemaking framework, problems are framed as simple, complicated, complex, chaotic, with a final domain as disorder when there is no clear indication of what kind of problem one is experiencing.
Type 1 Problems
Type 1 problems are “simple problems,” which enjoy a consensus on a problem definition and solution. For example, computer programmers agree on a fix for an identified software problem where there is clear cause and effect. In this context, the solution is fairly straightforward and with their expertise, programmers solve the problem in a relatively short period of time with standard procedures.
Type 2 Problems
Type 2 problems are “complex problems.” There is less consensus on defining the problem and solving it. For example, a small city wants to try out new energy sources, wind, solar or established methods. Debates ensue as to the “best way” to provide energy to the city. Some citizens suggest increasing funding to fund greener options such as wind and solar while traditionalists suggest staying with electricity produced by nuclear power. Conflict and disagreement are persistent making the problem-solving process more complex.
Type 3 Problems
Type 3 problems are “wicked problems.” Wicked problems engender a high level of conflict among the stakeholders with no agreement on the problem or solution. For example, the world is experiencing melting ice in the Arctic, intense heat waves in odd locations, frequent wildfires, flooding and massive drought, powerful tropical storms, one after another, with prolonged and more damaging consequences, sea level rise, natural ecosystem degradation and species extinction on a grand scale. In these instances, there is broad disagreement on the problem and its solution. Attempts to address ‘the problem’ accomplish little. Political and resource constraints force constant re-definitions of the problem and its solutions as interested parties come and go and community preferences shift. Officials launch efforts to address massive freqent flooding only to abandon them as short-term weather patterns change and political will evaporates. The problem-solving process is further complicated because stakeholders in a democratic society have the power to block initiatives not of their liking through lawsuits, judicial reviews, and the time-honored tradition of throwing the ‘rascals’ out of office. Nothing really bounds the problem-solving process — it is experienced as ambiguous, fluid, complex, political and frustrating as hell. In short, it is wicked.
Something Wicked This Way Comes
What exactly is a wicked problem?
A wicked problem is a social or cultural problem that is difficult or impossible to solve for as many as four reasons:
incomplete or contradictory knowledge, the number of people and opinions involved, the large economic burden, and the interconnected nature of these problems with other problems.
Horst Rittel and Melvin M. Webber in 1973 formally described the concept of wicked problems in a 1973 treatise called “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” contrasting “wicked” problems with relatively “tame,” solvable problems such problems in mathematics, chess, or puzzle solving.
Rittel and Webber’s 1973 formulation of wicked problems in social policy planning specified ten characteristics:
1.There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.
In our previous example of a computer problem, those with the necessary training and background have all the information they need to solve the problem. This is not possible with wicked-problems. The information needed to understand the problem depends upon one’s idea or framing for solving it.
2. Wicked problems have no-stopping rule.
In the computer problem example, the programmer knows when he or she has solved the problem. According to Rittel and Webber, “[t]he planner terminates work on a wicked problem, not for reasons inherent in the “logic” of the problem. He stops for considerations that are external to the problem: he runs out of time, or money, or patience. He finally says, “That’s good enough,” or “This is the best I can do within the limitations of the project,” (bounded rationality and satisficing) or “I like this solution, etc.” It’s hard, maybe impossible, to measure or claim success with wicked problems because they bleed into one another, unlike the boundaries of traditional design problems that can be articulated or defined.
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but better or worse.
The end-user for the computer problem can be definite as to whether or not the problem has been solved. In a wicked problem environment, this is not the case. For wicked problems, according to Rittel/Webber “[t]there are no true or false answers. Normally, many parties are equally equipped, interested, and/or entitled to judge the solutions, although none has the power to set formal decision rules to determine correctness. Their judgments are likely to differ widely to accord with their group or personal interests, their special value-sets and their ideological predilections. Their assessments of proposed solutions are expressed as “good” or “bad” or, more likely, as “better or worse” or “satisfying” or “good enough.”
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.
For tame or simple problems one can determine on the spot how good a solution-attempt has been. More accurately, the test of a solution is entirely under the control of the few people who are involved and interested in the problem. With wicked problems, on the other hand, any solution, after being implemented, will generate waves of consequences over an extended — virtually an unbounded — period of time. Moreover, the next day’s consequences of the solution may yield utterly undesirable repercussions which outweigh the intended advantages. In such cases, one would have been better off if the plan had never been carried out. There is no template, plan, policy or protocol, standard operating procedure or checklist to follow when tackling a wicked problem, although history may provide a guide. Teams that approach wicked problems must literally make things up as they go along. The full consequences cannot be appraised until the waves of repercussions have completely run out, and we have no way of tracing all the waves through all the affected lives ahead of time or within a limited time span.
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation,” because there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, every attempt counts significantly.
This is where it can get really tricky. On “one-shot” operations, the biases of the planner can send things into chaos or lead to productivity. More than one explanation for a wicked problem usually exists, with the remedy appropriateness depending greatly on the individual biases and heuristics of the planner. This attribute of wicked problems is where groupthink can get played out. Rittel and Webber said that “every implemented solution is consequential. It leaves “traces” that cannot be undone. Large public-works are effectively irreversible, and the consequences they generate have long half-lives. Many people’s lives will have been irreversibly influenced, and large amounts of money will have been spent on another irreversible act. Whenever actions are effectively irreversible and whenever the half-lives of the consequences are long, every trial count. Additionally, every attempt to reverse a decision or to correct for the undesired consequences poses another set of wicked problems, which are in turn subject to the same dilemmas.” In legislation, when you hear the terms “we are here to fix the unintended consequences” you know you’re dealing with a wicked problem that wasn’t well thought out.
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable or an exhaustively describable set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.
With social and cultural problems there is an interconnected quality that crosses over into the domains of geo-economic, geo-cultural, geo-physical and geo-psychosocial realms. Rittel and Webber said, “[t]here are no criteria which enable one to prove that all solutions to a wicked problem have been identified and considered. In the pursuit of a wicked planning problem, a host of potential solutions arises and another host is never thought up. It is then a matter of judgment whether one should try to enlarge the available set or not. And it is, of course, a matter of judgment which of these solutions should be pursued and implemented. Which strategies-or-moves are permissible in dealing with crime in the streets, for example, have been enumerated? “Anything goes,” or at least, any new idea for a planning measure may become a serious candidate for a re-solution. Rittel and Webber give the following example, [w]hat should we do to reduce street crime? Should we disarm the police, as they do in England, since even criminals are less likely to shoot unarmed men? Or repeal the laws that define crime, such as those that make marijuana use a criminal act or those that make car theft a criminal act? That would reduce crime by changing definitions. Try moral rearmament and substitute ethical self-control for police and court control? Shoot all criminals and thus reduce the numbers who commit crime? Give away free loot to would-be-thieves, and so reduce the incentive to crime ? And so on. In such fields of ill-defined problems and hence ill-definable solutions, the set of feasible plans of action relies on realistic judgment, the capability to appraise “exotic” ideas and on the amount of trust and credibility between planner and clientele that lead to the conclusion, “OK let’s try that.”
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
Humans rely on their pattern-making brains to make sense of the world by looking for a pattern that they have seen before. In wicked problems patterns don’t exist, they are novel and new. Attempts to apply patterns seen before sometimes backfire into other novel problems. Rittel and Webber give the following example, “[t]”he conditions in a city constructing a subway may look similar to the conditions in San Francisco, say; but planners would be ill-advised to transfer the San Francisco solutions directly. Differences in commuter habits or residential patterns may far outweigh similarities in subway layout, downtown layout and the rest. In the more complex world of social policy planning, every situation is likely to be one-of-a-kind. If we are right about that, the direct transference of the physical-science and engineering into social policy might be dysfunctional, i.e. positively harmful.” “Solutions” might be applied to seemingly familiar problems which are quite incompatible with them.
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.
Offering a “solution” to a wicked problem frequently is a “one shot” design effort because a significant intervention changes the design space enough to minimize the ability for trial and error. That’s why you need diversity of ideas and creative driven people in dealing with wicked problems because you need more than one idea. Rittel and Webber noted that “[p]roblems can be described as discrepancies between the state of affairs as it is and the state as it ought to be. The process of resolving the problem starts with the search for causal explanation of the discrepancy. Removal of that cause poses another problem of which the original problem is a “symptom.” In turn, it can be considered the symptom of still another, “higher level” problem. Here lies a difficulty with incrementalism, as well. This doctrine advertises a policy of small steps, in the hope of contributing systematically to overall improvement. If, however, the problem is attacked on too low a level (an increment), then success of resolution may result in making things worse, because it may become more difficult to deal with the higher problems. Marginal improvement does not guarantee overall improvement. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the members of an organization tend to see the problems on a level below their own level.”
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem’s resolution.
How one frames a problem is some indication of the direction of potential solutions. Crime in the streets thorough a law-enforcement frame may be vastly different from the frame of a public health professional. Both frames provide a direction in addressing the problem of crime in the streets. Which one is right? Rittle and Webber state that “[t]here is no rule or procedure to determine the “correct” explanation or combination of them. The reason is that in dealing with wicked problems there are several more ways of refuting a hypothesis than there are permissible in the sciences. Essentially, attitudinal criteria guide the choice. People choose those explanations which are most plausible to them. Somewhat but not much exaggerated, you might say that everybody picks an explanation of a discrepancy which fits his intentions best and which conforms to the action-prospects that are available to him. The analyst’s “world view” is the strongest determining factor in explaining a discrepancy or perception.” From a social psychology perspective, seeking solutions that already fit a strongly held belief is known as confirmation bias.
10. The social planner has no right to be wrong (i.e., planners are liable for the consequences of the actions they generate).
In the scientific world, problems are examined, and several hypotheses are generated which require people either to confirm or refute the premise. No one is held accountable for an ill-refuted hypothesis because that is the scientific process. However, Rittle and Webber state that “in the world of social and cultural planning related to wicked problems, no such immunity is tolerated. Here the aim is not to find the truth, but to improve some characteristics of the world where people live. Planners are liable for the consequences of the actions they generate; the effects can matter a great deal to those people that are touched by those actions. Planners who work in a security ecosystem that do not tolerate exploration and potential failure are less likely to examine problems from a diverse viewpoint.
So, Now What?
As we’ve discussed up to this point, wickedness of a problem isn’t a degree of difficulty. Traditional processes cannot resolve them. Not only do traditional linear top-down processes fail to tackle wicked problems, they actually may exacerbate situations and generate more undesirable consequences. Sometimes, the strategy to deal with wicked problems is a wicked problem. Traditional homeland security and emergency management top-down linear, military framed strategies fail to address the social context of wicked problems. Social/Cultural psychology and processes in general are seen as soft science and incompatible with military might. This framing will continue to fail us in addressing wicked problems. Although we have a long history of wicked problems, the awareness of them, especially in the homeland security and emergency management ecosystem has just begun to take shape. According to Roberts, “”[w]e can speculate on the recognition and rise of wicked problems at this point in time. Perhaps the expansion of democracy, market economies, privatization, travel and social exchanges highlight value differences and thus promote dissensus rather than consensus.”
This is where we pivot to Roberts and Snowden’s insight into how to address and make sense of wicked problems. Roberts help us identify three strategies to examine what kind of problem we have and Snowden then helps us make sense of the domain we are in and what possible actions to take.
Three Coping Strategies for Wicked Problems
The Roberts model outlined in a 2000 paper “Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution,” is based on:
· the level of conflict in the problem-solving process,
· the distribution of power among stakeholders, and
· the degree to which power is contested.
Three questions prompt strategy selection.
· How much conflict is present in the problem-solving process?
· How much power is dispersed among all the stakeholders?
· Is the power contested?
The Three Strategies are:
Authoritative
The Authoritative Strategy seeks to solve wicked problem by investing the accountability and responsibility in the hands of very few people. While the reduced number of people involved also reduces the complexity of the problem, it also limits competing points of view. This of course also limits the number of unique perspectives necessary for tackling a wicked problem. Power is not dispersed.
Competitive
The Competitive Strategy is one where wicked problems are addressed by pitting opposing points of view against each other. The advantage of this approach is that different solutions can be weighed up against each other and the best one chosen. The disadvantage is that this adversarial approach creates a confrontational environment in which knowledge sharing is discouraged. Consequently, the parties involved may not have an incentive to come up with their best possible solution. Power is contested.
Collaborative
The Collaborative Strategy is one that seeks to engage the diversity of all stakeholders in order to find the best possible solution for everyone involved. Typically, this approach involve gathering all involved and all ideas are discussed and the approach is mutually agreed upon. Power is not contested.
Figure 1 Summation
If there is a low level of conflict, then we have a simple or Type 1 problem. If conflict exists over solutions, then we face a complex or Type 2 problem. If there is conflict over the problem definition and its solution, then we confront a wicked or Type 3 problem.
If power is concentrated in the hands of a small number of stakeholders, then authoritative strategies can be employed to identify the problem and its solution. If power among the stakeholders is dispersed, we proceed to a third question. Is power contested among the diverse set of stakeholders, meaning is there a struggle for power that characterizes their interactions? If power is dispersed and contested, then competitive strategies can be employed. If power is dispersed but not contested, then collaborative strategies can be utilized. Thus, we find three generic strategies for coping with wicked problems.
Cynefin Sensemaking Framework
Most of us think that we are rational people making rational decisions. We make the assumption that when presented with a problem, we just need to analyze it from all angles and make a decision on how to address it. This assumption is based on the thought that we can identify cause and effect readily. But, the world is becoming increasingly more and more complex and a different way of thinking and responding is necessary.
The Harvard Business Review article, “The Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” explores the complex dynamics of decision making related to complexity theory and sensemaking. The authors, David Snowden and Mary Boone utilize the Cynefin Framework, to help leaders understand the context of operations in certain domains. According to the Welch/English dictionary, Cynefin (ku-nev-in) is a Welch word that means “haunt, habitat, acquainted, accustomed, familiar,” and is socially constructed to denote a decision-makers “sense of place” from which to view their perceptions. The term also signifies multiple factors in an environment that influence us in ways that are unpredictable and hard to understand.
The framework has four domains, simple, complicated, complex and chaotic.
Dave Snowden created the Cynefin Framework in 1999 when he worked at IBM. He currently is the founder and chief scientific officer of Cognitive Edge. Cognitive Edge, was created in 2005 with the objective of building methods, tools and capability to develop insights from Complex Adaptive Systems theory and other scientific disciplines in social systems. He talks about his framework of “sensemaking” in complex and chaotic environments in the video below.
Four Operational Domains
Each operational domain requires different actions. Key to understanding the domains is that for many organizations, operations are based on fact-based management using traditional management techniques. However, many of the current challenges for leaders come from an unordered and unpredictable world.
The Cynefin framework helps leaders understand how the social complexity and adaptability of problems fit into defined categories and what behaviors arise as problems emerge to become increasingly more complex.
Simple: The Domain of Best Practices
In the simple/obvious we see known-knowns. This is where checklists and best practices live alongside good practices. The situation is stable, and the relationship between cause and effect is clear: if you do X, expect Y. Ordinary management techniques live here with all the vaunted “lessons-learned” formats. If you solve the problem, you simply go back to status quo. Historically and tragically, this is the category that many first responder organizations use to understand problems. The “right” answers live here.
Complicated: The Domain of Experts
The complicated domain consists of the “known unknowns.” In this domain we can still clearly see cause and effect which requires analysis or expertise. The complicated domain is where one can assess the facts, analyze, and apply the appropriate good operating practice. At least one right answer exists. In the complicated and complex domains is where there is a tendency to be at risk for “groupthink.” When experts get together, they tend to reinforce their existing already strongly held beliefs. For example, the decision to invade Iraq was greatly influcenced by the complicated/complex domains and groupthink.
Complex: The Domain of Emergence
The complex domain represents the “unknown unknowns.” Here’s where things start to get confusing. It is in this domain where cause and effect can only be seen in hindsight. According to Snowden and Boone, “patterns … can emerge, if the leader conducts experiments that are safe to fail.” In the framework process, this is called “probe–sense–respond.” In the complex domain, right answers are hard to identify. Climate change, terrorism and emergent diseases processes are examples of the complex domain.
Chaotic: The Domain of Rapid Response
In the chaotic domain, cause and effect are very unclear. Events in this domain are “too confusing to wait for a knowledge-based response,” writes organization expert and author Patrick Lambe. “Action — any action — is the first and only way to respond appropriately.” Snowden and Boone note, “in this context, managers “act–sense–respond.” In other words, one can act to establish order; sense where stability lies, and respond to turn the chaotic into the complex. In “Surfing the Edge of Chaos,” authors state that “in the face of threat, or when galvanized by a compelling opportunity, living things move toward the edge of chaos. This condition evokes higher levels of mutation and experimentation, and fresh new solutions are more likely to be found.” In this context, there is opportunity for new ways of thinking, as well as threat. This domain is the Ying-Yang, both threat and opportunity domain. Interestingly, we saw this in action with Harvey when ordinary citizens acted on behalf of their neighbors, sensing the situation as it emerged and responding in heroic fashion. In the chaotic domain, a leader’s immediate job is not to discover patterns but to stanch the bleeding. Hurricane Harvey, Superstorm Sandy and September 11th are examples of the chaotic domain.
Disorder
In the middle of the domains is the area of disorder. Here is where all the problems that are yet to be determined in which domain they belong live. This is the whirling sea of complexity.
In many homeland security agencies, focus for problem solving is limited to the simple and complicated domains, even though current challenges fall into the complex and chaotic domains.
Secret Sauce
The “secret sauce” of using the Cynefin Framework as a sensemaking tool is understanding it enough to know when you’ve moved from one domain to another. When one can sense the dynamics of the various domains, then one knows the danger signals and what response is appropriate. When crisis occurs, many leaders can misunderstand the complexity of the challenge and respond in ways that are incongruent to the crisis. However, the ability to sense, analyze, respond and act correctly to the presenting environment lessens disorder and mistakes and helps guide decision-making.
Additionally, leading across the four domains with the ability to shift back and forth creates pattern-based leadership, extremely helpful with the changing environment of many homeland security and emergency management challenges. All situations and problems are not created equal, so having a framework that helps to understand that different situations and responses is incredibly powerful.
In Dave Snowden’s own words
As an example, here is the Cynefin Framework used to make decisons during the Occupy Movement protests.
Putting it all Together
As I mentioned earlier, using Roberts and Snowden’s tools helps develop insight into how to address and make sense of wicked problems. Defining any given problem correctly helps reduce the “unintended consquences” of applying a wrong remedy. Roberts help us identify three strategies to examine what kind of problem we have and Snowden then helps us make sense of the domain we are in and what possible actions to take. Applying these tools not only helps in the middle of disaster response but can also serve as a preconception tools prior to any given challenge or disaster.
In this chart, I have combined both Roberts and Snowden’s tools related to Search and Rescue (SAR) example where the SAR situation becomes increasingly more and more complex, evolving into a wicked situation.
In summary, as global challenges increase in complexity, security practitioners need analytical tools to understand not only cause and effect but the interconnectedness and interdependencies of the threats. The two tools in the blog post are helpful in that endeavor. Thinking in systems is important because systems may exhibit adaptive, dynamic, goal-seeking, self-preserving, and sometimes evolutionary behavior. Understanding the complexity of the environment helps the practitioner decide the response needed.
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Angi English is currently the Chief of Staff at the New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and a HSx Founding Scholar for Innovation at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (HSx 1701). She has a Master’s in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security (MS 1303/1304)and a Master’s in Educational Psychology from Baylor University. She’s also a graduate of the Executive Leader’s Program at the Naval Postgraduate School (ELP 1201). She is a Certified Part 107 Unmanned Aerial Systems pilot and serves as an Advisory Member of the DRONEREPONDERS and a Brand Ambassador for Women Who Drone, a Licensed Professional Counselor and aLicensed Marriage and Family Therapist. She lives in Santa Fe, New Mexico.
